@eclipse-docks/extension-sqleditor
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable pattern for this package going forward. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent pattern across the @eclipse-docks extension packages; not indicative of malice. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across the entire @eclipse-docks package family; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@eclipse-docks/extension-monaco-editor | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org peer dependency; declared but used as a runtime peer, not directly imported in source. | ai |
Versions (showing 42 of 42)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.110 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.109 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.108 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.107 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.106 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.105 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.104 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.103 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.102 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.101 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.100 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.99 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.98 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.97 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.96 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.95 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.94 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.93 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.92 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.91 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.90 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.89 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.88 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.87 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.86 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.85 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.84 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.83 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.82 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.81 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.80 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.79 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.77 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.76 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.75 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.74 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.73 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.72 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.71 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.70 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.69 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.7.68 | 2 / 3 |
v0.7.110
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.109
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.108
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.107
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.106
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.105
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.104
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.103
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.102
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.101
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.100
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.99
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.98
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.97
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.96
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.95
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.94
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.93
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.92
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.91
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.90
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.89
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.88
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.87
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.86
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.85
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.84
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.83
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.82
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.81
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.80
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.79
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.77
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.76
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.75
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.74
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.73
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.72
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.71
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.70
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.69
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.68
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.