@eeacms/volto-slate-zotero
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:cypress/support/commands.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 string is a PNG test fixture in Cypress support file; not a malicious payload. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Publisher has 33 approved packages; EEA org with consistent repo metadata; dormancy is not suspicious here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): EEA org package with consistent publishing history; lack of Sigstore attestation is standard for this publisher. | ai |
v7.0.1
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.