@effect-aws/client-cloudwatch-logs
Effectful AWS CloudWatch Logs client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@effect-aws/commons | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same effect-aws monorepo; not an independent supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all versions of this package; low-risk AWS wrapper with no other signals. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.11.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.2 | 2 / 0 |
v1.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.10.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.10.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.10.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.