@effect-aws/client-lambda
Effectful AWS Lambda client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@effect-aws/commons | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same effect-aws monorepo; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established monorepo package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.11.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.2 | 2 / 0 |
v1.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.10.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.10.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.10.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.10.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.