@effect-uai/google
Google Gemini provider for @effect-uai/core.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher is GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; CI/CD publishing is the documented workflow for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/dist-DMsg8YLb.mjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output (tsdown); sample shows tinyrainbow ANSI codes, not network/exec malware. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.5.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 3 |
v0.5.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.