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@eforge-build/engine

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Autonomous plan-build-review orchestration engine. Implementation detail of @eforge-build/eforge - not intended for direct consumption.

28
Versions
Apache-2.0
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

schaakesolutions

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals present to elevate this. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@eforge-build/client AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package; likely used indirectly via re-exports rather than direct import. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:ora AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json; likely used in compiled dist output not visible to static import analysis. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:chalk AI (phantom-deps): Declared in package.json; likely used in compiled dist output not visible to static import analysis. ai

Versions (showing 28 of 28)

Version Deps Published
0.8.1 15 / 3
0.7.20 15 / 3
0.7.12 13 / 3
0.7.11 13 / 3
0.7.10 13 / 3
0.7.9 13 / 3
0.7.8 12 / 3
0.7.7 12 / 3
0.7.6 12 / 3
0.7.4 12 / 3
0.7.3 12 / 3
0.7.2 12 / 3
0.7.1 12 / 3
0.7.0 12 / 3
0.6.2 12 / 3
0.6.0 12 / 3
0.5.12 12 / 3
0.5.11 12 / 3
0.5.10 12 / 3
0.5.9 12 / 3
0.5.8 12 / 3
0.5.6 12 / 3
0.5.5 12 / 3
0.5.4 12 / 3
0.5.3 12 / 3
0.5.2 12 / 3
0.5.1 12 / 3
0.5.0 12 / 3

v0.8.1

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: schaakesolutions → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-12, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (schaakesolutions) on 2026-07-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.7.20

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: schaakesolutions → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-20, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (schaakesolutions) on 2026-05-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.5.9

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.5

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.