@egjs/vue-flicking
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cfcs/vue2 | AI (dependencies): Part of the egjs/cfcs ecosystem; stable dependency for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@egjs/flicking | AI (dependencies): Core egjs/flicking dependency; same org, stable across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established NAVER package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.15.0 | 4 / 23 | |
| 4.14.1 | 4 / 23 | |
| 4.14.0 | 4 / 23 | |
| 4.13.0 | 2 / 19 |
v4.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.14.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.14.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.13.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.