@ehmpathy/as-command
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Standard husky dev-hooks setup; no-op outside a git repo, safe for end-users. | ai |
v1.0.5
2 findingsScript: [ -d .git ] && npx husky install || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
2 findingsScript: [ -d .git ] && npx husky install || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.