@ehmpathy/uni-time
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA provenance; consistent with CI/CD automation by same org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:test-fns | AI (phantom-deps): test-fns appears in both dependencies and devDependencies; depcheck false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:domain-objects | AI (phantom-deps): domain-objects is a new runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic likely fires due to indirect/config usage. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance via CI/CD Sigstore attestation; stable signal for this package. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Standard husky git-hook guard; no-ops outside git repos, no network calls or arbitrary code. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.10.0 | 4 / 30 | |
| 1.9.6 | 4 / 30 | |
| 1.9.5 | 6 / 29 | |
| 1.9.4 | 6 / 29 | |
| 1.8.2 | 5 / 25 | |
| 1.8.1 | 5 / 25 |
v1.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.9.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.9.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.9.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.8.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.1
2 findingsScript: [ -d .git ] && npm run prepare:husky || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.