@elastic/apm-rum
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established Elastic org package; sparse README/keywords are cosmetic, not spam indicators. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.17.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.17.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.17.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.17.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.17.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.16.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.16.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 5.16.1 | 1 / 0 |
v5.17.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.16.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account (obltmachine) than the most recent previously approved version (elasticmachine) on 2025-01-10. It has since remained available on npm for 554 days without being unpublished, which is inconsistent with an account takeover — those are typically removed by npm shortly after discovery.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.16.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.16.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.