@elastic/react-search-ui
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Elastic org team rotation; new maintainers are Elastic-affiliated accounts. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Elastic org team rotation; removals consistent with legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established Elastic monorepo package; sparse README/no keywords is a style choice, not spam. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large Elastic monorepo; lack of Sigstore provenance is consistent across their npm releases. | ai |
v1.24.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.23.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-04-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.21.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.