@electivus/apex-log-viewer-win32-arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific binary package (win32-arm64); .exe is the intended artifact, consistent with esbuild/electron split-package pattern. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No-description/no-repo/no-deps signals are expected for platform-specific binary sub-packages in this distribution pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.12
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/apex-log-viewer.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.