@electric-sql/pglite-postgis
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; consistent with electric-sql org's publishing practices. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation provides stronger supply chain integrity than gitHead field; absence is benign here. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 4 |
v0.0.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v0.0.2
3 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (sgwillis) on 2026-03-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.