@electrum-cash/protocol
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@generalprotocols/eslint-config | AI (npm-metadata): DevDependency only; same org as package maintainer; no runtime impact. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@generalprotocols/cspell-dictionary | AI (npm-metadata): DevDependency only; same org as package maintainer; no runtime impact. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3.1 | 2 / 15 | |
| 2.3.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 2.2.3 | 2 / 15 | |
| 2.2.2 | 2 / 15 |
v2.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.