@endo/exo
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:next | AI (typosquat): Scoped @endo package; Levenshtein match to 'next' is a false positive with no brand impersonation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@endo/far | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic is unreliable for re-exported or indirectly used packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.0 | 8 / 14 | |
| 1.6.0 | 8 / 7 | |
| 1.5.12 | 7 / 12 | |
| 1.5.11 | 7 / 11 | |
| 1.5.10 | 7 / 11 |
v1.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.