@endo/nat
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:next | AI (typosquat): Scoped @endo package in established monorepo; not a typosquat of 'next'. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:nuxt | AI (typosquat): Scoped @endo package in established monorepo; not a typosquat of 'nuxt'. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:got | AI (typosquat): Scoped @endo package in established monorepo; not a typosquat of 'got'. | ai |
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.