@enso-ui/companies
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 5.2.0 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.1.7 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.1.6 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.1.5 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.1.4 | 3 / 13 | |
| 5.1.3 | 3 / 13 |
v5.2.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (aocneanu) than the most recent previously approved version (manuela.mindroc) on 2026-05-25, but aocneanu is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.