@envelop/depth-limit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): theguild-bot is The Guild's automation account managing the envelop ecosystem; transition from dotansimha is documented and consistent. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): theguild-bot addition is a known org-level automation account with strong track record across the ecosystem. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Long gap explained by monorepo migration to graphql-hive org; not indicative of account takeover. | ai |
v7.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.