@envelop/generic-auth
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): theguild-bot is The Guild's CI automation account; publisher transition from dotansimha is expected for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): theguild-bot is a known trusted automation account for The Guild org; stable pattern across their packages. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Both new deps are established @graphql-tools/@whatwg-node packages from the same org; low supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard TypeScript runtime helper; declared as direct dep and used implicitly by compiled output. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established envelop monorepo package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk indicator here. | ai |
v11.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.