@epam/ai-dial-modulify-ui
Modulify Toolkit (UI) for turning a monolith-like project into a modular one
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change reflects CI/CD migration (manual → GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation); consistent with EPAM's org-wide automation. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 132)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.47.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.47.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.47.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.47.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.47.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.46.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.45.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.42.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.41.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.41.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.41.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.41.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.41.4 | 0 / 0 |
v0.47.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.