@epilot/cli
CLI for epilot APIs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/auth-login-NHWG3STD.js | AI (source-diff): tsup bundle with readable source comments; not obfuscated, just minified CLI output. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/init-QZTZF2JC.js | AI (source-diff): File only uses fs/path to scaffold project files; no network calls or dynamic execution present. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/auth-login-X2GRQW6N.js | AI (source-diff): tsup build output with long lines from bundling; readable source comments confirm legitimate CLI code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @epilot/cli is not a plausible typosquat of joi; Levenshtein match is spurious. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:axios | AI (phantom-deps): axios is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic fires incorrectly for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.37 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.36 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.35 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.34 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.33 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.32 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.28 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.23 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.22 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.21 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.20 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.19 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.18 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.17 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.16 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.15 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.12 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 8 / 5 |
v0.1.37
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.23
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.22
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.19
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.