@epilot/pricing-client
Client for epilot Pricing APIs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@dazn/lambda-powertools-correlation-ids | AI (dependencies): Known AWS Lambda observability library from DAZN; stable legitimate dependency for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established epilot SDK package; lack of provenance is consistent across all 266 versions and is not a risk indicator here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:buffer | AI (phantom-deps): Node.js polyfill for browser bundle; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:url | AI (phantom-deps): Node.js polyfill for browser bundle; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:https-browserify | AI (phantom-deps): Node.js polyfill for browser bundle; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:stream-http | AI (phantom-deps): Node.js polyfill for browser bundle; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:util | AI (phantom-deps): Node.js polyfill for browser bundle; stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.54.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 3.54.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 3.53.7 | 7 / 9 | |
| 3.53.6 | 7 / 9 | |
| 3.51.0 | 7 / 12 | |
| 3.47.7 | 7 / 12 |
v3.54.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (julian.maurer) than the most recent previously approved version (alexmarqs) on 2026-05-29, but julian.maurer is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.54.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (julian.maurer) than the most recent previously approved version (alexmarqs) on 2026-05-27, but julian.maurer is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.53.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.51.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.47.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.