@equinor/fusion-framework-module-http
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Equinor fusion-framework packages consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.0.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 8.0.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 8.0.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.8 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.5 | 4 / 2 |
v8.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.