@equinor/fusion-query
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@equinor/fusion-log | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; likely used transitively or conditionally within the package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.0.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.0.4 | 5 / 5 | |
| 6.0.3 | 5 / 5 | |
| 6.0.2 | 5 / 5 |
v7.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.