@equos/node-sdk
Equos.ai node.js official SDK.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/ | AI (email-domain): Author field contains a LinkedIn URL, not an email domain; no registerable domain at risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:axios | AI (phantom-deps): axios is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic misfires when import is indirect. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.12 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.11 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.10 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.9 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.8 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.7 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.6 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.5 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.2.3 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.2.2 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.4 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.3 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.0.11 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.0.10 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.0.9 | 1 / 9 |
v3.1.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.8
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.6
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.3
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.4
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.3
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.11
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.10
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.9
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%C3%AFc-combis-a211a813a/' uses domain 'https://www.linkedin.com/in/lo%c3%afc-combis-a211a813a/' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.