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A WebAssembly shim for esbuild on OpenHarmony ARM64.

10
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

esbuild

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): esbuild.wasm is the package's core artifact; expected for wasm shim. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; provenance improved. ai
semgrep semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect AI (semgrep): Reflect.get() in wasm_exec.js is standard Go WASM runtime boilerplate; stable false positive for this package. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): New platform target (OpenHarmony) added after gap; SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI/CD publish. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific shim stub; tiny payload and no deps are by design for esbuild's OS/CPU-targeted packages. ai

Versions (showing 10 of 10)

Version Deps Published
0.28.1 0 / 0
0.28.0 0 / 0
0.27.7 0 / 0
0.27.6 0 / 0
0.27.5 0 / 0
0.27.4 0 / 0
0.27.3 0 / 0
0.27.2 0 / 0
0.27.1 0 / 0
0.0.1 0 / 0

v0.27.7

3 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • esbuild.wasm

HIGH Publisher changed: esbuild → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.27.6

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.27.5

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: esbuild → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-02, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (esbuild) on 2026-04-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.27.4

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: esbuild → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-12, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (esbuild) on 2026-03-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.27.3

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: esbuild → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-05, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (esbuild) on 2026-02-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.27.2

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: esbuild → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-17, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (esbuild) on 2025-12-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.27.1

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: esbuild → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-03, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (esbuild) on 2025-12-03, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.