@esome-dev/sunflow
sunflow - Power Plant Monitoring
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with public GitHub repo; lack of Sigstore attestation is common for this ecosystem. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Raw IP is 127.0.0.1 in a development config file — not a malicious exfiltration endpoint. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 encode/decode is part of a standard Excel download utility; no network call or payload execution. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.115 | 36 / 1 | |
| 1.2.112 | 36 / 1 | |
| 1.2.90 | 36 / 1 | |
| 1.2.85 | 36 / 1 | |
| 1.2.67 | 36 / 1 | |
| 1.2.61 | 36 / 1 |
v1.2.115
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.112
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.90
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.85
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.67
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.61
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.