@esotericsoftware/spine-canvas
The official Spine Runtimes for the web.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established official Esoteric Software package; lack of Sigstore provenance is consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:LicenseRef-LICENSE | AI (license): Spine Runtimes uses a custom license (Spine Runtimes License Agreement); stable across all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 206)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.119 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.118 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.117 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.116 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.115 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.114 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.113 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.112 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.111 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.110 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.109 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.108 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.107 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.106 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.105 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.104 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.103 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.102 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.101 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.100 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.99 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.98 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.97 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.96 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.95 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.94 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.93 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.92 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.91 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.90 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.89 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.88 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.87 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.86 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.85 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.84 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.83 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.82 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.81 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.80 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.79 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.78 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.77 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.76 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.75 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.74 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.73 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.72 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.71 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.70 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.69 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.68 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.67 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.66 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.65 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.64 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.63 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.62 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.61 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.60 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.59 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.58 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.57 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.48 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.47 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.46 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.45 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.44 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.43 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.42 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.41 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.40 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.39 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.38 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.37 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.36 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.35 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.34 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.33 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.32 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.31 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.30 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.29 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.28 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.27 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.26 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.25 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.24 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.23 | 1 / 0 |
v4.3.13
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (daaaaa) on 2026-07-24, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.3.12
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (daaaaa) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.3.11
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (daaaaa) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.2.80
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.79
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.78
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.77
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.76
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.75
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.74
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.73
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.72
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.71
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.70
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.69
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.68
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.67
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.66
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.65
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.64
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.63
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.61
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.59
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.58
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.57
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.48
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.47
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.46
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.45
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (daaaaa) than the most recent previously approved version (badlogic) on 2024-06-06, but daaaaa is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.2.44
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (badlogic) than the most recent previously approved version (daaaaa) on 2024-06-04, but badlogic is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.2.43
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (daaaaa) than the most recent previously approved version (badlogic) on 2024-05-17, but daaaaa is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.2.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.38
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.33
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.