@esotericsoftware/spine-player
The official Spine Runtimes for the web.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/esm/spine-player.mjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled/minified ESM output for a WebGL runtime; not obfuscated, stable pattern across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established official Esoteric Software package; provenance attestation not historically provided by this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 214)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.119 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.118 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.117 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.116 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.115 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.114 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.113 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.112 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.111 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.110 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.109 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.108 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.107 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.106 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.105 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.104 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.103 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.102 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.101 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.100 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.99 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.98 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.97 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.96 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.95 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.94 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.93 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.92 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.91 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.90 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.89 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.88 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.87 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.86 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.85 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.84 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.83 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.82 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.81 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.80 | 1 / 0 |
v4.3.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.10
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (daaaaa) on 2026-07-06, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.2.80
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.