@espcompose/cli
ESPCompose CLI - Command-line tools for building ESPCompose projects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:assets/simulator-app/assets/index-CBg-HhJ3.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled React simulator app asset; minification is expected for this package's frontend component. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:assets/simulator-app/assets/index-CBg-HhJ3.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls are browser fetch for modulepreload; dynamic code execution is standard React runtime — not dropper behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:assets/simulator-app/assets/index-_rZ7OIFG.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls are fetch() for modulepreload; dynamic code is standard React/Vite bundle patterns, not dropper behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:assets/simulator-app/assets/index-_rZ7OIFG.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React production bundle; React license header and modulepreload logic confirm legitimate minified output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/init-2DWVNZV6.js | AI (source-diff): tsup/esbuild bundled output; long lines are minified deps (handlebars etc.), not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:assets/simulator-app/assets/index-DpThQxw0.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls and dynamic execution are normal browser app patterns in a bundled React simulator asset. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:assets/simulator-app/assets/index-DpThQxw0.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React production bundle; minification is expected for this simulator app asset. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/init-KD462OAR.js | AI (source-diff): File is a tsup/esbuild bundle of legitimate deps (handlebars etc.); long lines are from bundling, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:which | AI (phantom-deps): which is a standard CLI utility dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires on indirect usage patterns. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:yaml | AI (phantom-deps): yaml is a common config-parsing dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires on indirect usage patterns in CLI tools. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped ESPHome build tool; no relation to joi. Levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:typescript-eslint | AI (phantom-deps): typescript-eslint is used in ESLint config files, not directly imported — stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.7.0 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.6.3 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.6.2 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.6.1 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.6.0 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.5.0 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.4.0 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.3.2 | 5 / 12 | |
| 0.3.1 | 5 / 12 | |
| 0.2.2 | 5 / 12 | |
| 0.2.1 | 5 / 12 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 12 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 11 | |
| 0.1.0 | 13 / 6 | |
| 0.0.1 | 13 / 6 |
v0.7.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.