@esri/solution-velocity
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): mtschudi is a named contributor ([email protected]) in package.json; publisher change reflects legitimate Esri team account use. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@esri/arcgis-rest-auth | AI (phantom-deps): Same Esri org scope; declared dep used transitively, not a direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@esri/arcgis-rest-portal | AI (phantom-deps): Same Esri org scope; declared dep used transitively, not a direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@esri/arcgis-rest-request | AI (phantom-deps): Same Esri org scope; declared dep used transitively, not a direct import. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Esri monorepo package with 531 versions and clear repository linkage; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.5.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.5.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.4.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.3.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.3.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.0.2 | 5 / 2 |
v6.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.