@etohq/api-key
Eto API Key module
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:awilix | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep, referenced in config files; consistent with DI container usage pattern in this framework package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@mikro-orm/core | AI (phantom-deps): ORM peer dep referenced in config files; not a direct import by design in this module pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@mikro-orm/postgresql | AI (phantom-deps): ORM driver dep referenced in config files; same pattern as @mikro-orm/core. | ai |
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.