@etohq/file
Eto File module
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal framework module; sparse README and no keywords are expected for org-internal packages. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:vite | AI (typosquat): Scoped @etohq package; no brand/functionality overlap with vite. False positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.5.3 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.5.2 | 3 / 12 |
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.