@etohq/link-modules-sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all @etohq/* packages; absence of provenance is common and not a standalone risk here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.1 | 4 / 11 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 11 | |
| 1.5.3 | 4 / 11 | |
| 1.5.2 | 4 / 11 |
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.