@etohq/payment-stripe
Stripe payment provider for Eto
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@etohq/framework | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo dependency from the same @etohq org; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:awilix | AI (phantom-deps): awilix is explicitly declared as a dependency and peer dependency; phantom-dep fires because it's not directly imported in source. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.1 | 3 / 10 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.5.3 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.5.2 | 3 / 10 |
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.