@eui/core
eUI core package - holding UI components for Desktop applications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:docs/js/libs/vis.min.js | AI (source-diff): vis.min.js is the canonical vis.js 4.21.0 UMD bundle; network+exec pattern is standard module loading, not malware. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known Angular/TypeScript implicit runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped EU Commission Angular UI library; name similarity to 'cors' is coincidental, not a squatting attempt. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 21.2.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 21.2.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 21.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 19.3.15 | 1 / 0 | |
| 19.3.14 | 1 / 0 |
v21.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v21.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v19.3.15
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v19.3.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.