@eva/spine-base MIT 2 versions

@eva/spine-base

npm Homepage

@eva/spine-base

Versions

MIT

License

Install Scripts

Missing

Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

aspsndaz8641683bezoswiseyurijimizaiterrykingcha

Keywords

eva.js

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
dependencies	unvetted-dep:@eva/inspector-decorator	AI (dependencies): Sibling @eva-scoped package used consistently across the eva.js ecosystem; stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/18
bogus-package	bogus-package	AI (bogus-package): Part of the established EVA.js monorepo; sparse README is typical for internal plugin packages.	ai	2026/04/29
provenance	no-provenance	AI (provenance): Long-lived package predating Sigstore provenance adoption; no provenance is expected for this org.	ai	2026/04/29

Versions (showing 2 of 2)

Version	Deps	Published
2.0.1	4 / 0	2026-04-21
2.0.0	4 / 0	2025-08-22

v2.0.0

1 finding

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.