@everymatrix/cashier-transaction-history
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Org-internal component pattern; 322 versions published under @everymatrix scope with consistent minimal metadata. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 214)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.73.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.72.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.72.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.72.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.71.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.71.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.70.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.73.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.72.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.72.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.72.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.71.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.71.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.70.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.