@evjs/client
Client-side runtime for the evjs framework
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 51 of 51)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.16 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.15 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.14 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.13 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.12 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.11 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.10 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.9 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.8 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.33 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.32 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.30 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.29 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.28 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.27 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.26 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.25 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.24 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.23 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.22 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.21 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.20 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.19 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.18 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.17 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.16 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.15 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.14 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.13 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.12 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.11 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.10 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.9 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.8 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 3 |
v0.2.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.14
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (xusd320) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.13
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (xusd320) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.