@evjs/ev
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish (xusd320) to GitHub Actions CI/CD is an improvement, not a compromise signal. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get used in a plain deep-merge loop; not obfuscation, stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Pattern is spreading process.env to pass environment to a child process with NODE_ENV override — standard and benign for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @evjs namespace package; not a typosquat of pg. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped @evjs namespace package; not a typosquat of qs. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:ajv | AI (typosquat): Scoped @evjs namespace package; not a typosquat of ajv. | ai |
Versions (showing 43 of 43)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.15 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.14 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.13 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.12 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.11 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.10 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.9 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.8 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.7 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.6 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.5 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.4 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.3 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.2.2 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.11 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.10 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.9 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.8 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.7 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.6 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.33 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.32 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.30 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.0.29 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.28 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.27 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.26 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.25 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.24 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.23 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.22 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.21 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.20 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.19 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.18 | 2 / 1 |
v0.2.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.