@evolution-sdk/devnet
Local Cardano devnet for testing and development with Docker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/Config.js | AI (source-diff): Long hex strings are CBOR-encoded Cardano cryptographic keys (KES, opcert) — expected devnet test fixtures. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:src/Config.ts | AI (source-diff): Same CBOR key material in source; stable false positive for this Cardano devnet package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to GitHub Actions CI is intentional; SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate org-controlled publish pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @noble/hashes is a well-audited cryptographic library; appropriate for a Cardano blockchain SDK package. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.10 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.9 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.32 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.31 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.30 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.29 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.28 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.27 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.26 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.25 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.23 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.22 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.21 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.20 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.19 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.18 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.17 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.16 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.15 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.14 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.13 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.12 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.10 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.9 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 3 |
v3.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.31
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.30
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.29
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.28
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.27
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.26
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.25
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.23
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.22
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.21
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.20
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.19
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.18
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.17
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.16
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.15
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.14
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.13
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.