@executor-js/plugin-google-discovery
Turn any [Google Discovery API](https://developers.google.com/discovery) (Calendar, Gmail, Drive, Sheets, etc.) into a set of executor tools. Handles the discovery document, OAuth flow, and per-request token binding.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; repo owner matches prior publisher identity. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.33 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.32 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.31 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.30 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.29 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.28 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.27 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.26 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.25 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.24 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.23 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.21 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.4.20 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.1 | 4 / 8 |
v1.4.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.29
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.27
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.25
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.