@executor-js/plugin-graphql
Introspect a GraphQL endpoint and expose its queries and mutations as invokable tools on an executor.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation is a legitimate and expected automation pattern. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): graphql and graphql-yoga are canonical, well-established packages appropriate for a GraphQL plugin. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@effect/platform-node | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files only; stable false positive for this package's build setup. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.33 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.32 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.31 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.30 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.29 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.28 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.27 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.26 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.25 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.24 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.23 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.21 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.20 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.2.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.1 | 5 / 10 |
v1.4.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.29
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.27
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.25
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.