@executor-js/sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 51 of 51)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.35 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.34 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.33 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.32 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.31 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.30 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.29 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.28 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.5.27 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.26 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.25 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.24 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.23 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.22 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.21 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.20 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.19 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.18 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.17 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.16 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.15 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.14 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.13 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.12 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.11 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.10 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.9 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.8 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.7 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.2 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.1 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.0 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.4.33 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.4.32 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.4.31 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.4.30 | 5 / 12 | |
| 1.4.29 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.28 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.27 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.26 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.25 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.24 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.23 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.21 | 5 / 9 | |
| 1.4.20 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.2.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.2.0 | 4 / 9 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 5 |
v2.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (rhyssullivan) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-06-10, but rhyssullivan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.