@exodus/ethereum-lib
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): Standard hex buffer conversion in sign-message.js; no obfuscation or malicious payload. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal monorepo package; sparse README is expected for org-internal libs. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.24.0 | 12 / 7 | |
| 5.23.0 | 12 / 7 | |
| 5.16.1 | 12 / 7 | |
| 5.16.0 | 12 / 7 | |
| 5.10.2 | 12 / 8 |
v5.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.16.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.10.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.