@ezuikit/control-date-picker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
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Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.5 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.0.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 1 |
v1.0.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (freeshine) on 2026-01-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.