@ezuikit/player-plugin-record
萤石ezopne协议播放器录制插件
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/libSystemTransformWASM.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten WASM loader boilerplate, not obfuscation; matches package's media-processing function. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/libSystemTransformWASM.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten runtime pattern-matches net+exec heuristics but is standard WASM glue code. | ai |
v9.1.0
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (freeshine) on 2026-07-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.