@fast-simon/utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped internal utility package from established org; missing metadata is a style choice, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent across all versions; internal utility package from known org. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.53 | 1 / 8 | |
| 1.0.52 | 1 / 8 | |
| 1.0.51 | 1 / 8 | |
| 1.0.50 | 1 / 8 | |
| 1.0.49 | 1 / 8 |
v1.0.53
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.52
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.51
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.50
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.49
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.