@fastify/multipart
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@fastify/error | AI (dependencies): @fastify/error is a core Fastify ecosystem package maintained by the same org; stable dependency for any @fastify/* plugin. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:fastify-plugin | AI (dependencies): fastify-plugin is the standard plugin wrapper for Fastify; a canonical dependency for all Fastify plugins. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Fastify org package published by known maintainer matteo.collina; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a concern here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.0.0 | 5 / 16 | |
| 9.4.0 | 5 / 16 | |
| 9.3.0 | 5 / 16 | |
| 9.2.1 | 5 / 17 |
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.