@fastify/swagger
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): The base64 string in the test file is a PNG image fixture (iVBORw0KGgo... is the standard PNG header). It's in a TypeScript type test file, not production code, and poses no security risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.7.0 | 5 / 12 | |
| 9.6.1 | 5 / 12 | |
| 9.6.0 | 5 / 12 | |
| 9.5.2 | 5 / 12 | |
| 9.5.1 | 5 / 13 |
v9.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.